 
	by Andrew McGregor - Agosto de 2006
	Rockets are not new weapons, nor are they strangers to Middle East warfare. 
	Size, range and destructive power are all factors in the development of 
	rocket-based strategies, the ultimate of which was the "Mutually Assured 
	Destruction" of the Cold War. The rockets used by Hezbollah in the ongoing 
	conflict with Israel are much smaller and are usually integrated elsewhere 
	within the tactics of the battlefield. Hezbollah is known for innovation, 
	however, and has developed new strategic uses for their unguided rockets, 
	employing them as political, economic and psychological weapons. As stated 
	by Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres on August 6, "Nobody 
	understands why they started to attack, what the purpose of the attack was 
	and why they are using so many rockets and missiles."
	
	The chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee 
	described why Hezbollah has been able to keep the rockets flying despite 
	extreme military pressure from Israel: "Hezbollah separated its leadership 
	command-and-control systems from its field organization. It created a 
	network of tiny cells in each village that had no operational mission except 
	to wait for the moment when they should activate the Katyusha rocket 
	launchers hidden in local houses, using coordinates programmed long ago" 
	(San Francisco Chronicle, July 21).
	
	The 122mm Katyusha (range: 20-25 kilometers) is the mainstay of Hezbollah's 
	rocket arsenal. "Katyusha" is somewhat of a generic term today, covering a 
	wide variety of small, unguided, solid-fuel rockets produced by a number of 
	countries, including Iran. The Katyushas all have a common origin in the 
	Soviet BM-8 and BM-13 truck-mounted rocket launchers that were used against 
	the German army in 1941. Fired in short-range volleys of as many as 48 
	rockets at a time, they had an immediate military and psychological impact 
	on German troops. 
	
	Hezbollah usually fires their version of the Katyusha one at a time from 
	improvised launching facilities. Some Katyusha-type multiple-rocket 
	launching systems were specifically designed to be dismantled into single 
	units for guerrilla use. In 2001, the first truck-mounted launching systems 
	were reported in Hezbollah's arsenal, making more effective volley-launches 
	possible. There are some recent instances of volley-firing, such as the 
	attacks on the Israeli town of Acre on August 3.
	
	Once in the air, the cheaply-made Katyushas are remarkably difficult to 
	stop. A few years ago, Israel and the United States cooperated in a joint 
	project to develop a "Tactical High Energy Laser" (THEL) to bring down such 
	rockets by igniting the warhead in mid-air through the use of a high-energy 
	chemical laser. In tests the system successfully destroyed several Katyusha 
	rockets, but mobility difficulties and technical concerns related to the 
	chemical fuel led to a cut in funding for the project in 2004. Research is 
	underway on a more-portable version with an electrically powered laser, but 
	production of this costly system is still years away.
	
	The unguided Katyusha is not intended to strike a specific target. Rather, 
	it is designed to be fired with 16 or more of its kind in a salvo that rains 
	destruction upon a certain area, preferably a troop concentration, massed 
	armor or fortified emplacements. By firing Katyusha-type rockets singly (often 
	into sparsely occupied parts of Israel) Hezbollah has forgone the tactical 
	use of this weapon for strategic purposes. Here Hezbollah signals its 
	mastery of media warfare; the media covers wars like a sporting event, with 
	the scorecard being the most important element in determining who is winning. 
	Besides the daily updates of the number of troops killed, the number of 
	civilians killed and the number of air-raids launched, the media also 
	dutifully records the daily tally of rockets fired. Despite causing 
	insignificant physical damage, each rocket arrives like a message of 
	defiance, a signal to the Arab world that Israel is not invincible. 
	Hezbollah routinely looks for new uses for existing weapons in its arsenal, 
	and in this case they have transformed a battlefield weapon into a means of 
	political warfare.
	
	Bringing Tel Aviv in Range
	The introduction of longer-range Iranian-made Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets (also 
	known as the Ra'ad, or by the Hezbollah name "Khaibar") has given the 
	conflict a new dimension, with Hezbollah no longer restricted to hitting the 
	thinly populated Israeli north. The 240mm Fajr-3 has a range of 45 
	kilometers and carries a 45 kilogram warhead, while the 333mm Fajr-5 has a 
	range of 70-75 kilometers and carries a 90 kilogram warhead. Both systems 
	are usually truck-mounted. The Fajr-5 was first used in the July 28 attack 
	on the Israeli town of Afula, then again in an attack on the West Bank town 
	of Jenin on August 3. At the extreme limits of their range, the Fajr-type 
	rockets are accurate only to within a one kilometer radius.
	
	An Iranian official recently confirmed that Zelzal-2 rockets, with a stated 
	range of 200 kilometers (although this figure may be significantly 
	exaggerated), had been provided to Hezbollah by Iran for use "in defense of 
	Lebanon" (Haaretz, August 5). The 610mm Zelzal-2 is a 3,500 kilogram rocket 
	with a 600 kilogram high-explosive warhead, first delivered to Revolutionary 
	Guard units in Lebanon in 2002. Israeli intelligence believes the missile is 
	capable of reaching the northern suburbs of Tel Aviv. Although the rocket is 
	unguided and difficult to use, the threat from the Zelzal-2 is taken 
	seriously, with U.S.-made Patriot anti-missile systems deploying near 
	Netanya to guard Tel Aviv. The Patriot system is useful only against larger, 
	longer-range rockets, with no effectiveness against the smaller Katyusha 
	types. 
	
	On August 3, Hezbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah made a televised offer 
	to Israel to stop firing Hezbollah rockets in exchange for an end to Israeli 
	air strikes in Lebanon. The Shiite leader warned, however, that Hezbollah 
	would fire its rockets at Tel Aviv if the Israeli Air Force attacked Beirut 
	(al-Manar TV, August 3). It is possible that Hezbollah requires Iran's 
	permission to attack Tel Aviv. The largest weapons in Hezbollah's missile 
	arsenal are likely to be at least partially manned by members of Iran's 
	Revolutionary Guards.
	
	Grapes of Wrath Revisited
	The current Israeli operation bears a great similarity to Israel's 1996 
	"Grapes of Wrath" operation: a massive military response to Hezbollah's 
	launching of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel despite the occupation of 
	the Israeli "security zone" in southern Lebanon. Proclamations that it was 
	time to end the "Katyusha menace" came to nothing as the offensive had 
	little effect on Hezbollah's rocket capabilities and took few Hezbollah 
	lives at a great cost to Lebanese civilians. Hezbollah rocket launches were 
	carefully tallied by the Lebanese public as a measure of the movement's 
	success on the battlefield. The Shiite movement was strengthened politically 
	through armed resistance to Israel, while the Israeli government of Shimon 
	Peres lost the next election. 
	
	Following the 2000 evacuation of the south Lebanese security zone, Israel 
	refrained from responding directly to Hezbollah provocations along the 
	border in mid-2001 and spring 2002. The Israeli government was aware that 
	targeting Hezbollah would bring a flurry of rockets across the border, 
	followed by an inevitable escalation and probable re-occupation of a region 
	that Israel had just evacuated. For a time, at least, renewed war in south 
	Lebanon carried too high a political price.
	
	Conclusion
	Hezbollah's rocket strategy has successfully disrupted all activities in 
	northern Israel, forcing 300,000 Israelis into shelters or refugee camps, 
	and impressing upon Israelis that building a wall around their country is 
	not enough to ensure permanent security. Israel's war is incredibly 
	expensive, and the deployment of the reserves creates an economic drain that 
	is difficult for a small state like Israel to sustain. As long as Hezbollah 
	can continue to send rockets across the border, it strikes an economic blow 
	on its enemy. Continuing to fire the rockets also goads Israeli ground 
	forces into military confrontation with the guerrillas on ground that 
	Hezbollah has prepared for six years. 
	
	The size of Israel's proposed security barrier keeps changing with the 
	realization that even an occupation up to the Litani River (a zone 28-35 
	kilometers deep) will keep only Hezbollah's short-range Katyushas from 
	reaching Israel. A measure of this reality (and the importance of the "scorecard") 
	was reflected in the August 1 televised remarks of Israeli Prime Minister 
	Ehud Olmert: "I believe one can say today…that there is no way to measure 
	this war according to the number or range of the rockets being fired at us. 
	From the very first day, neither I, nor the defense minister, nor the 
	Israeli government, nor the military leadership—and this is to its credit—ever 
	promised for even one moment that when the fighting ended, there would be 
	absolutely no rockets within firing range of the State of Israel. No one can 
	make such a promise" (Israel TV Channel 1, August 6).
	
	The resistance of Hezbollah fighters, the severity of the Israeli bombing 
	campaign and the inability of Israel to halt the rockets has resulted in 
	unusually broad popular support for Hezbollah both in Lebanon and a 
	politically frustrated Arab world. When ceasefire negotiations begin, it 
	will now be difficult for the Arab regimes that opposed Hezbollah at the 
	beginning of the conflict (particularly Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) to 
	ignore Hezbollah's calls for at least diplomatic support from the Arab 
	states. In the meantime, Hezbollah's rocket campaign continues to destroy 
	little militarily while it accomplishes much politically, economically and 
	psychologically.
 
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