“Siempre ha sido la lengua compañera del Imperio” Antonio de Nebrija, al presentar su Gramática de la lengua castellana a Isabel de Castilla (1492)
The future of american military strategy
Michael P. Noonan (*) . Foreign Policy Research Institute
www.fpri.org Marzo 2006
Vale la pena publicar material en inglés, si no lo tenemos en nuestro idioma, y dice algo que nos interesa conocer. Muchos compatriotas lo manejan razonablemente bien (mientras, recordemos las sabias palabras de Nebrija)
En este caso, el texto que puse en la página es la transcripción de una conferencia organizada hace pocos meses para analizar estrategias alternativas – diplomáticas y militares - para la política del gobierno estadounidense. No se confundan con la National Security Strategy (Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional), publicación oficial de la Casa Blanca, que nuestros diarios reprodujeron el 17/3/06. Esta es una reunión de militares (en actividad y en retiro), profesores universitarios y miembros del gobierno, reunidos por la iniciativa de una institución privada. Ésta, el F.P.R.I., es cercana al establishment republicano, pero mantiene lazos estrechos con otras entidades vinculadas a los Demócratas (ver lista de aportantes). En todo caso, lo que aquí se habla es lo que piensan sus propios expertos sobre los intereses y las opciones norteamericanas, especulando libremente, sin estar sujetos por los intereses políticos del gobierno de turno y los convencionalismos de las cancillerías. Estas instituciones son una de las fortalezas a envidiar de lo que Aron llamaba la “república imperial”.
(El artículo ha sido separado en tres partes para facilitar su descarga)
The Foreign Policy Research Institute held a conference on the future of
American military strategy on 5 December 2005 at the Union League of
Philadelphia. A distinguished group drawn from the current and retired ranks of
the military (active and reserve component), academia, and policy analysis
convened to explore alternative strategies for American defense policy. Michael
P. Noonan and James Kurth, the Claude Smith Professor of Political Science at
Swarthmore College, Editor of Orbis, and Senior Fellow at the FPRI, served as
panel moderators. In attendance were over one hundred individuals drawn from
academia, non- governmental organizations, the media, the military, and the
interested public. The following is a brief summary of the conference
proceedings. The complete collection of conference papers will be published in
2006.
The conference was structured around four panels that addressed distinct models
("strategic drivers") for American military strategy: (1) irregular warfare (threat-based),
(2) "offshore balancing" (minimalist), (3) countering a rising peer competitor
("Pax Americana"), and (4) a balanced approach ("strategic pluralism"). For each
panel, a single presentation served as the starting point of a discussion among
the presenter and the other two panelists. In addition, the luncheon keynote
address (the W.W. Keen Butcher Lecture on Military Affairs) served as a bridge
between the morning and afternoon discussions. The views expressed within this
report are those of the respective speakers and should not be construed to
represent any agency of the U.S. government or other institution.
FPRI's Program on National Security gratefully acknowledges the financial
support provided for this conference by Dr. John M. Templeton, Jr., W.W. Keen
Butcher, and the Hamilton Family Foundation. Many thanks are also extended to
the Honorable John Hillen. Before entering government in autumn 2005, Dr. Hillen,
in his role as Director of FPRI's Program on National Security, made many
contributions, intellectual and otherwise, to this and other projects.
COMPLEX IRREGULAR WARFARE
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMCR (ret.), a Research Fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) as well as a non-resident Senior Fellow of the FPRI, began by arguing that a world of irregular (both low-end and high-end) and unconventional warfare is our future, and that this world did not start on 9/11, but rather began either in Beirut in 1983 or else in the World Trade Center attack of 1993. The U.S. military is experiencing its second age of small wars. This necessitates a resilient strategy where institutions need to be more adaptive, agile, and anticipatory.
The military -- and non-military arms of the government -- should be adapted to
deal with a very unconventional world. The global force posture should be
flexible using a light international footprint to allow for tailored responses
to crises. The Army, while generally moving in the right direction in terms of
being more agile and expeditionary, is still too focused on conventional threats.
To address this, Hoffman stated that more investment needed to be made in
infantry forces, civil affairs and psychological operations units and less
emphasis should be placed in heavy mechanized force structure and investment.
The Air Force brings significant capabilities to the table in terms of strategic
mobility and warfighting, but its investment priorities should focus upon
developing a future bomber, space capabilities, information warfare, and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) rather than procuring large numbers of expensive
fighter aircraft such as the F-22. The Marine Corps should become more modular,
and the current three division/three air wing force should transition to six
brigades that would be more cohesive and provide a rotation base for long-term
conflicts. Because small wars require small unit leaders who are more mature,
more seasoned, and more experienced, the Marines need to adjust manpower
policies and training to develop and retain such leaders. Lastly, the Navy needs
to adjust from its surplus of strike and "blue" water (open ocean) assets and
develop more "green" (littoral) and "brown" (inland/riverine) water capabilities.
Three aircraft carriers should be mothballed - - leaving nine in the fleet --
and smaller boats should be purchased to deal with unconventional threats.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) would be split off to form a distinct, yet small,
service.
Hoffman compared the United States to a "one-armed cyclops." The military tool
of national power has been developed, resourced, and honed at the expense of
other elements of national power. In order to rectify that situation, Hoffman
made several recommendations. On the domestic side, more homeland resilience
needs to be developed. Most of the National Guard should be transitioned to the
Department of Homeland Security with force structure adjustments made to make it
more useful for domestic operations. The Coast Guard, too, should have its end-strength
increased by 10-20 percent and needs modernized equipment (e.g., ships,
helicopters, and UAVs). Internationally, the State Department and other inter-agency
actors need to be bolstered and need to work with the international community.
Hoffman called for increased funding for State Department stabilization
initiatives and more investment in threat reduction programs.
Irregular warfare is not a passing fad. Hoffman declared "complex irregular
warfare is the form of conflict that gives us the most problems and will
challenge us the most in the future." The United States does not dominate all
technologies and all forms of warfare and is particularly weak culturally and
capability-wise in the unconventional realm. Our enemies have learned from
places such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq to be more efficient, cunning, and
savage. The Pentagon is thinking about a much more irregular world, but it must
face the imponderables, put aside parochial illusions about the future, and "not
allow our enemies to outstrip the march of our imagination, our intelligence or
our resolve."
Monica Duffy Toft, an Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Kennedy School
of Government and the Assistant Director of the John M. Olin Institute for
Strategic Studies, Harvard University, argued that the idea of using the
Department of Defense (DoD) to fight terrorism is, and should remain, a
controversial one. The threat from non- state actors is not comparable to the
threat of global thermonuclear war or even a major conventional war. "It is not
clear that converting the military to resilient structure, capable of engaging
complex irregular threats will give the traction we need to do well in a major
conventional war," said Toft. Enemies (whose motivations are variable), or
potential enemies, will look for our strengths and try to exploit our weaknesses.
Future threats are hard to discern, therefore we should make our capabilities
opaque. In other words, the U.S. military should develop multiple core
competencies to leave our enemies, or potential adversaries, guessing.
Colonel John D. Waghelstein, USA (ret.), a Professor Emeritus of the U.S. Naval
War College, opened by saying that opponents going asymmetric is nothing new.
But the military has real trouble in dealing with this. According to Waghelstein,
"this is not just the fact that we have been unprepared because of the sine wave
of 'mobilization, fight the war, demobilization' and then be unprepared in
numbers and force structure and infrastructure for the next war, it has also
been a preoccupation with the Army in particular of focusing on the next big war,
as opposed to whatever little war might be at hand_ that is in the DNA of the
Army." He argued that keeping assets such as civil affairs and psychological
operations co-located with Special Operations Forces was necessary because
otherwise they might fall prey to the budgetary priorities of the big services.
He remained skeptical whether the services, even the Marine Corps, would be
willing to invest the time and resources into developing irregular warfare
capabilities, particularly in the cultural and linguistic domains. To conclude
his comments, he held that while he agreed with most of Hoffman's position there
would need to for an "insurgency" both within the DoD and from outside --
probably in the Congress -- in order to make the necessary reforms.
(*)Michael P. Noonan is Research Fellow (Defense Policy) and Managing Director of the Program on National Security at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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